

Saturday, May 5, 12  
/C-II/DE Chronology

Sept. 4: JFK warning (K hastens deployment of R-12s, (S-4) by two weeks: F&N)

Sept. 6: K to Udall: SU would not press on Berlin until after elections (and mentions Cuba and allegation that US was putting nuclear weapons in Japan. (Iwakuni?)

Sept. 17: first warheads leave SU (F&N)

Oct. 2: McN directive to be ready for invasion or blockade by Oct. 20

Oct. 4: warheads arrive in Cuba on Indigirka : for R-12, Luna tac; Il-28, FKR cruise (45,000 KT)

Oct. 4: Bolshakov to RFK: "only weapons of a defensive character"

Oct. 10 Keating speech on 6 IRBM sites

Oct. 16: McN assumes some missiles may be operational (?) and warheads may be present (true!) and thus, invasion would be folly.

Oct. 18: JCS urges full invasion.

Oct. 20, Saturday: CIA says 8 MRBMs ready to fire, and "we believe warheads either are or will be available.

(How could there be real consideration of either air attack or invasion after this?! What were JCS thinking?)

Oct. 21 Sunday: Sweeney and JCS confirm they cannot guarantee taking out all op missiles. JFK decides on blockade (openly: probably much earlier) "as first step."

Oct. 21: Sunday, Oct. 21: in talks with Ormsby-Gore and Bartlett JFK reveals that he plans a deal on Turkey to resolve crisis, without an invasion (or air attack). RFK is revealing this at DOJ to brain trust. (Who?) 236-37 F&N. (Ref? McN saying this in meeting: Thursday?)

(So "blockade first..." was a bluff, wrt JCS, hawks on Excomm, public. The blockade (and alert) was to be the **only** military move. (Though it could have led to explosion if K had not shown his initial threats on resisting the blockade to be a bluff. Even then, the sub almost "resisted"—with a nuclear weapons!

He (and McN; and Rusk) (and LBJ?) agreed with Stevenson, except on sequence and timing.

Oct. 23 (F&N 249-250; Polmar 211 (citing Evan Thomas, RFK, 221-23 and F&N) Frank Holeman and Charles Bartlett both pass messages to Bolshakov from RFK (and reportedly JFK) was ready to trade the missiles (publicly? Possibly, "in quiet time, without crisis": meaning? Privately?) (Bartlett showing Bolshakov pictures). The GRU resident doesn't believe offer is real and initially holds Bolshakov's report back (until when?) (Does he tell Feklisov, the KGB Rezident?!)

Oct. 24: Likewise, K decides on Wednesday morning, to settle for a no-invasion pledge, "if he can't do better." (He offers this Friday night, when he thinks invasion imminent; so does Feklisov; but he tries for better on Saturday morning (taking up RFK proposals!; then reverts Sunday morning, as US attack **is** imminent (as K "knows," and JFK does not!)

(Compare VN in 1969: I think US esc is very likely, "eventually," more likely than N or HAK realize! And I'm right about the likely failure of their threats. But I didn't know they were about to carry them out right away, the next month (just as JFK might have invaded Cuba before the election, except for K moves to head this off. DID K imagine that JFK might move before the election, having found out before the missiles were all operational? Actually, he continued to threaten—and JCS wanted attack—even after missiles **were** operational. Do we have all the JCS records? What **were** they thinking?